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Abstract 
Participants read a vignette about a woman and man from a self (first-person) or other 
(third-person) perspective and predicted the likelihood of several outcomes. Later, they 
learned positive (marriage proposal), negative (rape), or no outcome information before 
recalling their original predictions and completing a memory questionnaire designed to 
investigate whether they misremembered details stereotypical of the outcome they learned. 
Perspective did not affect memory. Alternatively, outcome information did affect memory; 
however, only participants who learned negative outcome information exhibited hindsight 
bias, misremembering their initial likelihood ratings as being more consistent with the 
outcome than their original ratings actually were. Furthermore, performance on the vignette 
task did not correlate with performance on a standard paradigm for measuring hindsight 
bias. While taking another’s perspective rather than one’s own perspective may not make 
an outcome seem more or less predictable, learning negative outcome information likely 
makes an outcome seem more predictable in hindsight. 
Keywords:  hindsight bias; self-relevance; outcome valence  
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
In the early hours of June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen opened fire at Pulse nightclub in 
Orlando, Florida. By the time he was killed by police, he had taken the lives of 49 victims 
and severely wounded another 53, marking the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history. 
When a tragic event such as the mass shooting at Pulse nightclub occurs, people often look 
back and wonder, “should we have seen this coming?” It is a natural human tendency to 
ponder the past and wonder if there were warning signs. After this particular incident, 
media outlets devoted much time to outlining the “unmistakable” warning signs that 
Mateen would execute this murderous plot.  Media were quick to reveal that his school 
records showed that he was in constant trouble, that he had added his wife to his life 
insurance policy just months prior to the shooting, and perhaps most importantly, that the 
FBI had carried out an investigation on him three years earlier (Perez, Brown, & Almasy, 
2016). In fact, one source claimed that “…as details emerge about Mateen’s radical 
behavior, hindsight is revealing numerous warning signs, and the heat on the FBI is 
increasing” (Zimmerman, 2016). It is possible that this attack could have been prevented 
had people recognized the warning signs. However, with the aid of hindsight, it is much 
easier to look back on an outcome, and pick out those warning signs because one knows 
exactly how the event unfolded. When individuals perceive an outcome as more obvious 
and the preceding warning signs as more relevant once the outcome is known, a cognitive 
error known as hindsight bias has likely contributed to their judgments.   
Hindsight bias occurs when outcome knowledge influences one’s beliefs about 
what they could have, should have, or did know or believe about an outcome, or its 
preceding events, before the outcome was known (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 
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1991; Fischhoff, 1975, 1977; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004). For 
example, hindsight bias may occur when individuals believe that an outcome was more 
foreseeable once they have learned the outcome (hindsight) than before they knew what 
the result would be (foresight) (Roese & Vohs, 2012). When hindsight bias exists, outcome 
knowledge makes it challenging for an individual to return to his or her original naïve state, 
or the state prior to learning the outcome. Thus, the new knowledge may bias an 
individual’s memory of his or her original knowledge.   
1.1. Assessing and Measuring Hindsight Bias 
1.1.1. Hindsight bias designs  
There are two major ways to assess hindsight bias—the memory design and the 
hypothetical design. The major difference between these is whether participants make two 
separate judgments (one in foresight and one in hindsight) or just one judgment (either in 
foresight or in hindsight) about the outcome or correct answer to some event or question. 
In the memory design, participants first make judgments about the answer or outcome 
(hereafter singularly referred to as “outcomes”) of some event or question, without any 
knowledge of what the actual outcome is. After making their original judgments, 
participants eventually learn the actual outcome, also referred to as “outcome information,” 
to some event or question. Now armed with outcome information, participants attempt to 
recall their original judgments, a process that involves inhibiting their current knowledge 
of the actual outcome. Participants exhibit hindsight bias if, after learning outcome 
information, they recall their original judgments as being closer to the correct judgments 
than their original judgments actually were in foresight. Conversely, when individuals do 
not learn outcome information, they either accurately recall their original judgments or 
their recall of their original judgments shifts randomly, with some responses moving 
toward the correct answer and some moving away. 
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In the hypothetical design, there are typically two between-subject conditions: (1) 
a foresight condition and (2) a hindsight condition. In the foresight condition, participants 
do not learn outcome information before making judgments about the outcome to some 
event or question. Conversely, in the hindsight condition, participants learn outcome 
information before making judgments about what they would have originally predicted had 
they not known the outcome. Thus, participants in both conditions only make one 
judgment, rather than two separate judgments as is the case for the memory design. The 
judgments made by participants in the hindsight condition (i.e., those who possess outcome 
information) are compared to the judgments made by participants in the foresight condition 
(i.e., those who do not possess outcome information). The foresight condition serves as a 
control group while the hindsight condition serves as the experimental group. Research 
using hypothetical designs typically demonstrates that judgments made by those in the 
hindsight condition lie closer to the correct judgments than the foresight condition’s 
judgments. Hypothetical designs generally produce more hindsight bias than memory 
designs (Davies, 1992; Powell, 1988; Pohl, 2007).  
1.2. Hindsight bias paradigms  
Certain tasks are commonly used to study hindsight bias. For example, one of the 
most standard tasks for measuring hindsight bias is a trivia item paradigm in which 
participants try to answer a set of difficult trivia questions. These questions require 
numerical responses that lie on a continuous scale. Participants first provide their original 
judgments (term first developed by Erdfelder and Buchner, 1998) for each of the questions. 
Then, after some delay, participants learn the correct judgments to half the questions. The 
questions for which participants learn the correct judgments are the experimental items, 
while the questions for which participants receive no feedback are the control items. 
Finally, participants attempt to recollect their original judgments for all experimental and 
control items, and these recalled judgments are referred to as their recall of original 
judgments (Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988; 
Bayen, Erdfelder, Bearden, & Lozito, 2006).  
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In studies using trivia item paradigms, participants exhibit hindsight bias when after 
learning outcome information, their recall of their original judgments has shifted away 
from their original judgments and toward the correct judgments. For example, if asked, 
“What year did Leonardo da Vinci create Mona Lisa,” a participant may respond with 
“1420.” If this particular question was an experimental item, the participant would later be 
asked to recall her original judgment about when da Vinci painted Mona Lisa after learning 
that the correct judgment is actually 1503. After learning outcome information, she may 
recall her original judgment as “1490.” This shift away from the original judgment and 
toward the correct judgment is hindsight bias. If that participant had instead responded with 
“1400” after learning that da Vinci painted Mona Lisa in 1503, she would show a reverse 
hindsight bias, because her original judgment has shifted in the opposite direction from the 
correct judgment. Finally, if that participant had accurately recalled her original judgment 
of “1420”, she would show no hindsight bias. If the same question was instead a control 
item, the participant would not learn outcome information before recalling her original 
judgment. Therefore, she would either be expected to accurately recall her original 
judgment or to shift her response towards or away from the correct judgment (this shift 
would be expected to be random across multiple control items). Thus, there should be a 
systematically larger shift in judgments towards the correct judgments for experimental 
items than for control items. Research has shown that when using a memory design, 
hindsight bias is greatest when participants learn outcome information immediately before 
recalling their original judgment than it is when participants learn outcome information 
earlier, such as directly after making their original prediction (Hell et al., 1988). 
Another common task used to assess hindsight bias involves presenting participants 
with a scenario, typically depicting imaginary or real events, and asking them to judge the 
likelihood of various outcomes to the scenario. For example, participants might read a 
scenario about a battle between two armies and then rate the likelihood of each army 
winning. If using the hypothetical design with this task, participants in the experimental 
condition would learn outcome information after reading the scenario. Conversely, 
participants in the control condition would read the same scenario but would not learn 
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outcome information. Then, all participants would rate the likelihood of various outcomes; 
however, participants in the experimental condition would be asked to indicate what they 
would have believed the likelihood of the various outcomes to be had they not known the 
actual outcome. The experimental condition’s judgments would be compared to the control 
condition’s judgments in order to determine whether outcome information led to hindsight 
bias. The experimental condition would be expected to rate the likelihood of the outcome 
they learned as greater than in the control condition and greater than the other possible 
outcomes.   
1.3. Measuring hindsight bias  
There are several ways to measure hindsight bias (Pohl, 2007). Most commonly, 
hindsight bias is measured in terms of magnitude. For the memory design, hindsight bias 
magnitude is a measure of the degree to which participants’ recall of their original 
judgments shifts toward the correct judgments after learning outcome information. Thus, 
participants exhibit a greater magnitude of hindsight bias as their recall of their original 
judgments shifts further away from their original judgments and toward the correct 
judgments. For the hypothetical design, hindsight bias magnitude is a measure of the degree 
to which the experimental condition’s judgments differ from the control condition’s 
judgments. If outcome information influences hindsight judgments, participants in the 
experimental condition would be expected to have responses more consistent with the 
outcome information they learned when compared with participants in the control 
condition.  
Pohl (1992; 1995) developed a proximity index in which hindsight bias is computed 
for each item by subtracting the absolute difference between participants’ recall of their 
original judgment and the correct judgment from the absolute difference of participants’ 
original judgment and the correct judgment. Using this index, participants will receive a 
zero if their original judgment and recall of their original judgment are the same. 
Participants will receive a positive score if their recall of their original judgment is closer 
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to the correct judgment than their original judgment is. Finally, participants will receive a 
negative score if their recall of their original judgment is further from the correct judgment 
than their original judgment is. Then, researchers may calculate either the mean or median 
magnitude of all experimental items and all control items separately to produce a single 
measure of hindsight bias for each set of items.  
There is some debate over whether perfect recollections (i.e., when participants 
correctly recall their original judgments) should be included in the calculation of overall 
hindsight bias magnitude (Coolin, Bernstein, Thornton, & Thornton, 2014; Pohl, 2007). A 
perfect recollection of one’s original judgment on an item will result in a hindsight bias 
magnitude of zero for that item. Thus, including perfect recollections when calculating 
overall hindsight bias magnitude can systematically lower the apparent degree to which 
participants exhibited hindsight bias, particularly for individuals who recalled many of 
their original judgments. However, failing to include perfect recollections in calculating 
hindsight bias magnitude could also artificially increase the apparent degree to which 
participants show hindsight bias on a particular task. These potential consequences make 
it challenging to determine whether to include perfect recollections in calculating hindsight 
bias magnitude.  
1.4. Hindsight Bias Theories 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the effects of hindsight bias. Table 
1 summarizes the basic tenets of the major hindsight bias theories.   
 
Table 1.  Hindsight bias theories. 
Hindsight bias 
theory  
Basic Tenets of Theory Relevant Literature 
Hindsight bias is 
comprised of three 
separate hindsight 
components 
(1) Memory distortion: outcome 
information biases one’s 
recollections of their original 
predictions about an outcome 
Blank, Nestler, von 
Collani, & Fischer, 2008 
 
Blank & Peters, 2010 
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Hindsight bias 
theory  
Basic Tenets of Theory Relevant Literature 
 
(2) Foreseeability impressions: 
outcome information biases one’s 
beliefs about the predictability of 
an outcome 
 
(3) Inevitability impressions: 
outcome information biases one’s 
beliefs about how certain an 
outcome appears to have been 
 
Nestler, Blank, & Egloff, 
2010 
 
Cognitive 
Reconstruction 
(1) Recollection: the process of 
attempting to recall one’s original 
judgment after learning outcome 
information  
 
(2) Knowledge updating: the 
process of integrating outcome 
information into one’s existing 
knowledge base 
 
(3) Sense-making: the process of 
focusing on information consistent 
with outcome information while 
ignoring outcome-inconsistent 
information in order to make sense 
of the outcome 
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 
 
Roese & Vohs, 2012 
Anchoring and 
adjusting 
Individuals anchor onto outcome 
information and adjust their 
original predictions about the 
outcome to be consistent with their 
current knowledge of the outcome 
Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975 
 
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 
 
 
Motivational 
factors  
Individuals are motivated to 
exhibit hindsight bias either to 
increase their sense of control over 
their world, enhance their self-
esteem, or absolve themselves of 
responsibility for a negative 
outcome  
Campbell & Tesser, 1983 
 
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 
 
Roese & Vohs, 2012 
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Hindsight bias 
theory  
Basic Tenets of Theory Relevant Literature 
Defensive 
processing theory  
To minimize their responsibility 
for a negative outcome, individuals 
for whom the negative outcome is 
self-relevant report the outcome as 
less foreseeable and exhibit less 
hindsight bias than do individuals 
for whom the outcome is not self-
relevant  
Louie, 1999  
 
Mark & Mellor, 1991 
 
Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007 
Retroactive 
pessimism theory 
Because it is easier to accept a 
negative outcome they could not 
have prevented, individuals for 
whom the negative outcome is 
self-relevant report the outcome as 
more inevitable and exhibit more 
hindsight bias than do individuals 
for whom the outcome is not self-
relevant  
Sanna and Chang, 2003 
 
Tykocinski, Pick, & 
Kedmi, 2002 
 
Tykocinski & Steinberg, 
2005 
 
Hindsight bias has been called different names such as “the curse of knowledge” 
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989), and the “knew-it-all-along effect” (Wood, 1978). 
Furthermore, hindsight bias has often been conceptualized as a single phenomenon, with 
the defining feature being the influence of outcome knowledge on judgments about what 
one knew in foresight. Recently, some researchers have begun to argue that hindsight bias 
is comprised of three separate components: memory distortion, foreseeability impressions, 
and inevitability impressions (see e.g., Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008; Blank 
& Peters, 2010; Nestler, Blank, & Egloff, 2010). The first component, memory distortion, 
occurs when outcome information biases one’s recollections of their original predictions 
about outcomes, such that their hindsight judgments move away from their foresight 
judgments and toward the correct judgments. For example, memory distortion is commonly 
measured and observed using the classic trivia item paradigm. Memory distortion is 
believed to rely on several memory processes (e.g., Nestler et al., 2010 proposed five 
memory processes), but most certainly involves both a recollection and a reconstruction 
bias (discussed below).   
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According to Blank and colleagues, the second component of hindsight bias is 
foreseeability impressions. This component is a measure of the extent to which an 
individual believes they could have predicted an outcome (“I knew it all along”). These 
types of judgments should concern only what an individual could have objectively known 
prior to the outcome. However, sometimes estimations of foreseeability are made in 
hindsight, and thus, rely on subjective estimations of what an individual thought he/she or 
another person knew before an outcome occurred. Foreseeability is commonly measured 
using tasks that require participants to read the facts of a hypothetical or real event. In the 
experimental condition, participants would learn outcome information and then rate how 
likely it is that they would have predicted various outcomes or how obvious various 
outcomes were, including the outcome they learned. In the control condition, participants 
would learn no outcome information, and instead would judge the predicted foreseeability 
of various outcomes. Individuals show hindsight bias when their estimations of 
foreseeability are greater in hindsight than in foresight.   
The third component of hindsight bias, inevitability impressions, is a measure of 
how certain an outcome appears to have been. Inevitability is commonly measured using 
tasks whereby participants judge the probability of various outcomes after reading a 
vignette. Participants in the experimental condition would learn outcome informati on 
before judging the probability of various outcomes, and would be asked to rate the 
probability of the various outcomes as if they did not know the actual outcome. Participants 
in the control condition would not learn outcome information before judging the 
probability of the various outcomes. Hindsight bias, in terms of inevitability impressions, 
occurs when individuals estimate an outcome’s inevitability as greater in hindsight than in 
foresight.   
These three components (memory distortion, foreseeability impressions, and 
inevitability impressions) can either independently or jointly produce hindsight bias. For 
example, foreseeability and inevitability can be distinguished from memory distortion: 
while individuals’ recall of original judgments may be influenced by outcome information, 
their beliefs about the perceived foreseeability or inevitability of the outcome may remain 
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uninfluenced. Similarly, inevitability can be distinguished from foreseeability in that one’s 
impressions of the “objective state of the world” (inevitability; Blank & Peters, 2010, p. 
357) may be influenced by outcome information whereas one’s subjective impressions 
about the predictability of an outcome (foreseeability) may not change as a result of 
learning outcome information.     
Other theories propose different processes believed to contribute to hindsight bias. 
For example, according to the multinomial processing tree model of hindsight bias, 
recollection bias and reconstruction bias are the underlying processes that contribute to  
hindsight bias, or at least to the memory distortion component (Coolin, Erdfelder, 
Bernstein, Thornton, & Thornton, 2014; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998). When a participant 
aims to recall their original judgment, they will start by attempting to directly recall their 
original judgment. However, if outcome information interferes, they cannot accurately 
recall their original judgment. This results in a recollection bias, whereby participants more 
accurately recall their original judgments on items for which they did not learn outcome 
information than on items for which they did learn outcome information. If a participant 
cannot directly recall their original judgment, they must reconstruct their original 
judgment. When participants use outcome information as an anchor for reconstructing their 
original judgment, this results in a reconstruction bias, whereby participants’ recalled 
judgments systematically shift toward the correct judgments on items for which they 
learned outcome information.  
A similar theory suggests that hindsight bias is the result of cognitive reconstruction 
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), which according to Roese & Vohs (2012) is comprised of three 
major memory processes. The first memory process is recollection, which is the process of 
attempting to recall one’s original judgment after learning outcome information. The 
second memory process is knowledge updating, which involves integrating outcome 
information into one’s existing knowledge base. The third memory process is sense-
making, the process by which people focus on information that is consistent with the known 
outcome while ignoring outcome-inconsistent information. This process was originally 
described by Fischhoff (1975) as “creeping determinism,” which occurs when people learn 
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outcome information and then work to make sense of how the preceding events led to the 
outcome.  
Many studies have examined this sense-making process (Roese & Olson, 1996; 
Wilson, Gilbert, & Centerbar, 2003; Pezzo, 2003). It seems to contribute to hindsight 
judgments about how predictable an outcome was in foresight. As people focus their 
attention on reasons for which the outcome had to occur, the outcome becomes seemingly 
more predictable. In some cases, people may even misremember pre-outcome events that 
did not occur, but that are typically associated with a particular outcome in order to make 
sense of the outcome. For instance, Carli (1999) had participants read a vignette describing 
the relationship between a man and a woman. Some participants then learned that the 
vignette ended with a marriage proposal, while other participants learned that the vignette 
ended with a rape. Carli found that after learning outcome information, participants 
misremembered pre-outcome events consistent with the outcome they learned but that did 
not explicitly occur in the vignette they read. For example, participants who learned that 
the vignette ended with a rape were more likely to misremember that the man and woman 
had met at a bar. However, this detail was never actually stated in the vignette, and is rather, 
a stereotypical belief about events that can precede rape.  
Hindsight judgments may also involve an anchoring and adjusting process 
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). In this process, individuals anchor onto outcome information 
and adjust recall of their original predictions about the outcome to be consistent with their 
current knowledge of the outcome. However, this theory cannot fully account for hindsight 
bias for a few reasons. For one, if anchoring and adjusting fully accounted for hindsight 
bias, then one would expect that the amount of bias someone showed after learning an 
outcome did not occur would be equal to the amount of bias someone showed after learning 
an outcome did occur. This is because in both cases, individuals have a specific number to 
anchor onto. In the case of an outcome occurring, they can anchor on 100%. Alternatively, 
in the case of an outcome not occurring, they can anchor on 0%. Participants then should 
adjust their original predictions to be more consistent with that anchor. However, this does 
not occur. Researchers typically find that hindsight bias is larger when participants learn 
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that an outcome occurred than when they learn that an outcome did not occur (Fischhoff, 
1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975).  
Other literature has suggested that motivational factors are involved in hindsight 
bias (Campbell & Tesser, 1983; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Roese & Vohs, 2012). For 
example, individuals have a desire for predictability and order in their world, which may 
motivate people to believe an outcome was more predictable once the outcome is known, 
rather than believing there was no way they could have predicted that outcome (Walster, 
1967). If individuals shift their beliefs about the predictability of an outcome, it may give 
them the impression that they have more control over outcomes in their life. Hindsight bias 
may also be motivated by a desire to enhance or protect one’s own self-esteem. There are 
several ways this could occur. For example, in response to learning the correct judgment 
to a trivia question, an individual may be motivated to enhance his self-presentation by 
believing, and thus recalling, his pre-outcome prediction as being closer to the correct 
judgment than it was in actuality.  
Another way hindsight bias may enhance one’s self-esteem is if she perceives a 
favorable outcome as more foreseeable and/or inevitable in hindsight than in foresight. 
Consider, for instance, Linda who is nervous about whether she is qualified for a position 
she interviewed for and is unsure if she will receive a job offer. After being offered the 
position, however, Linda believes she was bound to get the job. In this case, she is 
motivated to perceive the outcome as more likely in hindsight because it implies that her 
qualifications distinguished her as a candidate for the position. Hindsight bias may also 
work to protect Linda’s self-esteem in the face of a negative outcome. For example, if 
Linda did not receive the job offer, she may come to believe that she did not have any 
control over the situation and that the outcome was inevitable, thus increasing hindsight 
bias, but only in terms of the inevitability component. Believing that an outcome was 
inevitable, and thus that she had no control over the outcome, may reduce Linda’s sense of 
responsibility for the outcome, therefore protecting her self-esteem. Two factors may be 
particularly important to motivational hindsight bias explanations: (1) outcome valence and 
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(2) the self-relevance of the outcome. Because the present study is concerned with 
investigating these two motivational explanations further, I explore these theories next. 
1.4.1. Outcome valence  
Hindsight bias studies often observe how individuals are influenced by an outcome 
that is not personally relevant to them; that is to say, an outcome that someone else 
experienced (Alicke, Davis, & Pezzo, 1994; Henrikson & Kaplan, 2003; Pezzo & Pezzo, 
2007). In these studies, the type of outcome information that participants learn may be 
manipulated, so that it is either positive, negative or neutral in nature. While research 
typically finds that participants will show hindsight bias consistent with the outcome 
information they learn (i.e., their hindsight judgments are impacted by outcome 
knowledge), the magnitude of that bias may be larger for negative outcomes than for 
positive or neutral outcomes (Blendon et al., 2002; Groebe, 2011). For example, in a study 
conducted by Schkade and Kilbourne (1991), participants read several scenarios about 
employees working on various projects. Participants either learned positive or negative 
outcome information about the outcome of each project. Schkade and Kilbourne 
discovered that despite all other details in the scenario being identical (i.e., same 
performance history and same actions taken to complete the project), participants who 
learned negative outcome information rated the outcome as significantly more foreseeable 
than participants who learned positive outcome information.  
In some cases, positive outcomes might either lead to similar hindsight bias 
magnitude as negative outcomes, or perhaps to even greater hindsight bias. Again, most of 
this research examines the impact of various types of outcome information on individuals 
evaluating an outcome another person has experienced. It seems that “when reviewing 
another’s decision, hindsight can occur irrespective of whether the outcome is positive or 
negative” (Louie, 1999; p. 29). However, this may not be the case for self-relevant 
outcomes. 
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1.4.2. Self-relevance of outcome  
How outcome information affects one’s beliefs about the predictability of an 
outcome may, in some part, depend on whether an outcome is personally relevant to that 
individual. According to the literature on the self-serving bias (Bradley, 1978; Miller & 
Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1979), people have a tendency to take credit for outcomes that 
reflect favorably on them and to avoid blame for outcomes that reflect unfavorably on 
them. Thus, when reflecting on past events that are self-relevant, individuals may recollect 
information in a way that serves their personal interests or enhances their self-regard (Ross 
& Wilson, 2002). From this stance, it could be expected that when a self-relevant outcome 
is positive, individuals will show more hindsight bias compared to when the outcome is 
negative. This is because by retrospectively judging a positive outcome as being more 
foreseeable, individuals give themselves more credit for the outcome. In fact, some studies 
have demonstrated this finding. In a study conducted by Louie (2005), participants read a 
case about a company and decided whether they would invest stock in that company. Then, 
participants either received favorable feedback (stock increased if they invested or 
decreased if they did not invest), unfavorable feedback (stock decreased if they invested or 
increased if they did not invest), or no feedback. Participants who received feedback 
subsequently made postdictions about what they would have estimated the price of stock 
to have been had they not read the case history of the company. Those who received no 
feedback made predictions about what they would have believed the price of stock to be 
had they not read the company’s case. Louie discovered that only participants who received 
favorable feedback exhibited hindsight bias; that is, their estimations about the stock price 
were biased toward the outcome information they learned compared to those who received 
unfavorable feedback or no feedback.  
Because research has typically found increased hindsight bias for positive self-
relevant outcomes, one might expect the opposite for negative self-relevant outcomes. In 
other words, compared to a person for whom a negative outcome is not self-relevant, an 
individual who experiences a negative self-relevant outcome would be expected to exhibit 
decreased hindsight bias so as to avoid blame for the negative outcome. For example, if a 
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person is fired from his job, he may perceive the outcome to have been less foreseeable 
than one of his coworkers might have. This is because the person who was fired would 
want to minimize his responsibility for that outcome. However, there are discrepancies in 
the literature about whether this is actually the case. People do “appear to selectively seek 
causes that minimize their culpability” (Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007, p. 150). However, this may 
occur in various ways that impact hindsight bias differently. There are two main theories 
behind how people react to a negative self-relevant outcome, and subsequently, whether 
they show hindsight bias as a result.  
The first theory is “defensive processing.” This theory suggests that individuals will 
report a negative self-relevant outcome as less foreseeable in hindsight because they want 
to minimize their responsibility for the negative outcome (Louie, 1999; Mark & Mellor, 
1991; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007). The notion here is that if a negative outcome was foreseeable, 
then they should have done something to avoid it. Thus, if they retrospectively judge the 
outcome as less foreseeable, then they assure themselves that they could not have acted 
any differently to avoid the negative outcome. This particular theory accords with the self-
serving bias proposition.   
Some studies have found that compared to participants evaluating a negative 
outcome that another person has experienced, participants evaluating a negative self-
relevant outcome show less hindsight bias. For example, Mark and Mellor (1991) 
investigated how the self-relevance of a job layoff impacted participants’ judgments about 
the foreseeability of the layoff. Participants included laid-off workers (for whom the 
negative outcome was most self-relevant), workers who had survived the layoff, and 
community members (for whom the outcome was least self-relevant). Mark and Mellor 
found that the laid-off workers rated the layoff as less foreseeable than workers who had 
survived the layoff, who rated the outcome as less foreseeable than community members. 
Apparently, as the outcome became less self-relevant for participants, it subsequently 
became more foreseeable.  
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The other theory for how people react to a negative self-relevant outcomes is 
“retroactive pessimism.” This theory proposes that hindsight bias is actually greater for a 
negative self-relevant outcome than it is for a negative outcome that is not self-relevant. 
The main tenet of this theory is that it might be easier for people to accept an outcome that 
was inevitable and therefore impossible for them to prevent. For example, if an employee 
is fired from her job, she might convince herself that there was nothing she could have 
done to prevent being fired since it was inevitable given company downsizing and her low-
ranking position (Sanna & Chang, 2003; Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi, 2002; Tykocinski & 
Steinberg, 2005). In a study by Tykocinski (2001; study 2), participants rated the likelihood 
of different candidates winning an election. They were asked to rate the likelihood of 
success for each candidate before and after the election, and the difference between these 
two judgments served as the hindsight bias measure. When participants chose the losing 
candidate (i.e., negative outcome), they exhibited greater hindsight bias than participants 
who voted for the winning candidate (i.e., positive outcome).  
Whether hindsight bias decreases or increases following a negative self-relevant 
outcome may be dependent upon how hindsight bias is being measured. For example, 
Pezzo and Pezzo (2007) suggest that defensive processing occurs because, “…in order to 
avoid culpability for a negative outcome, people perceive—or at least report—the event as 
unforeseeable” (p. 148). Alternatively, they suggest that retroactive pessimism is a product 
of “…convinc[ing] ourselves of the negative outcome’s inevitability” (p. 148). Thus, Pezzo 
and Pezzo indirectly imply that the defensive processing explanation only applies to 
judgments about the foreseeability of a negative self-relevant outcome and retroactive 
pessimism only applies to judgments about the inevitability of a negative self-relevant 
outcome. After finding evidence that the foreseeability component of hindsight bias could 
be distinguished from the inevitability component, Blank and Peters (2010) suggested and 
tested the idea that hindsight bias may decrease only when the foreseeability component is 
being measured, while hindsight bias may increase only when the inevitability component 
is being measured. They found evidence to support this notion; participants exhibited no 
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hindsight bias in terms of the foreseeability component and significant hindsight bias in 
terms of the inevitability component. 
To directly test the interaction of outcome valence and self-relevance on hindsight 
judgments, Mark, Boburka, Eyssell, Cohen, and Mellor (2003) compared differences in 
“retrospective judgments of foreseeability” among participants who learned positive or 
negative outcome information that varied in self-relevance. Participants proceeded in 
groups of three, with two participants playing a stock market game in which they bought 
stock, while a third participant observed the game. During the game, one of the players 
either learned a positive outcome (that their stock had greatly increased) or a negative 
outcome (that their stock had greatly decreased). The researchers believed that the outcome 
would be most self-relevant for the player who received either positive or negative outcome  
information about their stock. Conversely, they believed the outcome would be less self-
relevant for their opponent and least self-relevant for the observer. Mark et al. (2003) found 
that participants who learned negative self-relevant outcome information rated the outcome 
as less foreseeable than their opponents or the observers. However, there were no 
differences in retrospective foreseeability ratings for the positive outcome between 
participants for whom the outcome was self-relevant and those for whom it was not.  
This is one of the very few studies that directly examine interactions between 
outcome valence and outcome self-relevance on retrospective judgments of foreseeability. 
It provides evidence that the type of outcome information people learn as well as the 
personal relevance of the outcome may influence hindsight bias. However, because Mark 
et al. (2003) did not collect foresight judgments about the foreseeability of the outcome or 
include a condition in which participants learned no outcome information, it is unclear 
whether their effects constitute hindsight bias. Thus, further research is needed to 
determine the effect of outcome valence and outcome self-relevance on hindsight bias.   
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1.5. Hindsight bias in legal decision making 
Hindsight bias can have many implications in our everyday lives. For example, 
hindsight bias affects how we update our knowledge—as Pezzo and Pezzo  (2007) suggest, 
while outcome information may produce “some degree of hindsight bias,” it “should help 
people become better calibrated for future decisions” (p. 149). As our beliefs about various 
events or facts become more consistent with the correct judgments than they once were, 
we develop our own knowledge base.  However, some researchers worry that because of 
hindsight bias, we might not be able to learn from our past mistakes. If we believe we 
always could have predicted a negative outcome, how will we adjust our behavior in the 
future?  
There are circumstances in which hindsight bias can have serious consequences; 
for example, in our legal system. There are many opportunities for hindsight bias to occur 
throughout the course of legal proceedings. Judges, juries, witnesses, and experts are 
charged with the challenging task of evaluating some past event while attempting to ignore 
significant negative outcome information. Consider, for instance, a defendant who is being 
sued for negligence. As our legal system stands, defendants are only to be judged based on 
their conduct prior to the negligent act. Thus, triers should only consider what the defendant 
knew prior to the outcome, and if the damage or injury caused to the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions. That is, should they have foreseen the 
outcome, and if so, what should they have done to avoid it? However, the nature of the 
legal system requires triers to evaluate these past actions and events once the negative 
outcome is known. This has been empirically demonstrated with negligence judgments 
where mock triers who do not learn outcome information rate the outcome as less 
foreseeable and the defendant as less negligent than those who learn about the negative 
outcome before making their judgments of liability (see e.g., Groebe, 2011; Hastie & 
Viscusi, 1998; Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999; Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995). Given that 
researchers have consistently demonstrated that outcome information influences ones’ 
judgments of the predictability of an outcome, hindsight bias can lead to very dangerous, 
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and biased, legal decisions (Harley, 2007; Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; 
Hastie et al., 1999).  
Hindsight bias may also influence expert opinion, which can have dangerous 
consequences for judgments made in the legal context. For example, experts testifying in 
legal proceedings may overestimate the foreseeability of a particular outcome and lead 
triers to believe that a different decision should have been made (Arkes et al., 1981; 
Henriksen & Kaplan, 2003). Consider, for instance, a medical malpractice case in which a 
radiologist is being sued for failing to detect a tumor. Other radiologists may be asked to 
review the original images, and provide expert opinion on whether the radiologist breached 
a standard of care by failing to detect the tumor. However, when these experts review the 
original images, they have full knowledge of the outcome (i.e., that the patient has cancer). 
Thus, they are more likely to be able to detect the tumor in the original images, and 
overestimate the likelihood that the original radiologist should have been able to detect the 
tumor (Muhm, Miller, Fontana, Sanderson, & Uhlen- hopp, 1983). Other areas of law that 
are potentially impacted by the effects of hindsight bias continue to emerge; research has 
found that hindsight bias can affect decisions made in patent law, criminal law, and forensic 
investigations, among other areas of law (Casper, Benedict, & Kelly, 1988; Evelo & 
Greene, 2013; Giroux, Coburn, Harley, Connolly, & Bernstein, in press; Goodwill, Alison, 
Lehmann, Francis, & Eyre, 2010; Mandel, 2006).  
Most studies of hindsight bias in legal judgments investigate how hindsight bias 
impacts triers’ evaluations of a defendant’s and/or victim’s actions, and few examine 
whether hindsight bias occurs in victims/complainants or accused/defendants—that is to 
say, the people who were personally involved in the negative outcome. However, it is 
important to consider whether there are differences in hindsight bias among those who have 
personally experienced an outcome versus those evaluating an outcome another person has 
experienced. It may be the case that from an outsider’s hindsight perspective, a negative 
outcome seems more predictable than it actually was to the people who experienced the 
outcome. If that is the case, evaluators may overestimate a victim or defendant’s ability to 
have prevented the outcome, which could lead to biased legal judgments.   
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On the other hand, it may be that from the perspective of the person who personally 
experienced the outcome, the outcome seems more likely in hindsight. However, compared 
to those who did not personally experience the outcome, the person for whom the outcome 
is self-relevant may hold different beliefs about whether he/she could have prevented the 
outcome. A negative self-relevant outcome could either lead to defensive processing, in 
which an individual believes there was no way to have foreseen that outcome (reducing the 
magnitude of hindsight bias), or to retroactive pessimism, in which an individual convinces 
him or herself that the outcome was inevitable and his/her actions could not have altered 
the outcome (increasing the magnitude of hindsight bias). Differences in hindsight bias 
may arise from differences in the perspective from which one evaluates an outcome.  
1.6. Current Study 
There are mixed findings in the literature about how the outcome valence, as well 
as the self-relevance of an outcome, affect hindsight bias. Further, there is little research 
examining how the outcome valence and the self-relevance of an outcome interact and the 
subsequent consequences on hindsight bias. Given these mixed findings, a couple of 
questions directed my research. The first is whether there is a difference in the magnitude 
of hindsight bias people exhibit based on the type of outcome information (i.e., outcome 
valence) they learn—specifically, is there a difference in hindsight bias for positive versus 
negative outcomes? The second question is whether hindsight bias differs among people 
who personally experience an outcome versus those evaluating an outcome that another 
person has experienced, and if so, how does it differ? Finally, I was interested in whether 
there was an interaction between the outcome valence and the self-relevance of an 
outcome, and how this might impact hindsight bias. 
The goal of the present study was to replicate and extend the findings from Carli’s 
(1999) study. In Carli’s study, participants first read a vignette which described the 
relationship between a man named Jack and a woman named Barbara. At the end of the 
vignette, half the participants learned a positive outcome (Jack proposed to Barbara), while 
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the remaining participants learned a negative outcome (Jack raped Barbara). After a two-
week delay, participants were presented with four possible outcomes to the vignette they 
had read in the previous session: (1) Jack proposed to Barbara, (2) Jack raped Barbara, (3) 
Jack and Barbara began dating, and (4) Jack and Barbara had a one-night stand. They were 
asked to rate the likelihood of each of these outcomes on a nine-point rating scale as if they 
did not know the actual outcome. Carli found that participants exhibited hindsight bias 
consistent with the outcome they learned; participants who learned that Jack proposed to 
Barbara rated that positive outcome as more likely than participants in the negative 
outcome condition and alternatively, participants who learned that Jack raped Barbara rated 
that negative outcome as more likely than participants in the positive outcome condition. 
Therefore, the first objective of this study was to replicate Carli’s finding that participants 
show hindsight bias consistent with the outcome information they learn.  
I made a few modifications to Carli’s methodology in order to extend her findings. 
First, instead of using a hypothetical hindsight design, I used a memory design. In Carli’s 
study, participants only made one judgment about the likelihood of various outcomes being 
the ending to the vignette, and this judgment was made after they had learned outcome 
information. Alternatively, in the present study, participants were asked to provide both 
foresight and hindsight judgments about the likelihood of the various outcomes to the 
vignette. This modification was made in order to assess whether Carli’s results would 
replicate if participants were asked to make two separate judgments—one before learning 
outcome information and one after learning outcome information. Recent research suggests 
that hindsight bias can be measured/observed in terms of memory distortion, foreseeability 
and inevitability. While Carli’s hypothetical measure of hindsight bias most likely captured 
the inevitability component because participants were asked to rate the likelihood of 
various outcomes, it is possible that using a memory design would lead to different 
findings. These findings could lend support to the premise that the memory distortion 
component can be distinguished from the inevitability component. Thus, using a memory 
design instead of a hypothetical design allowed us to test this particular theory. 
Furthermore, memory designs often produce smaller effects than hypothetical designs 
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(Pohl, 2007); thus, whether Carli’s findings would replicate with a memory design may 
indicate the strength of the effect that outcome information had on participants’ original 
beliefs about the outcome. 
The second modification I made to Carli’s methodology was the addition of a third 
outcome condition. In Carli’s study, there were two experimental outcome conditions; 
participants either learned positive or negative outcome information. However, without a 
no outcome control condition, there are limitations on what one can conclude about the 
effect of outcome information on participants’ original predictions, as well as the direction 
of those effects. One would expect that learning positive outcome information would lead 
participants to rate the positive outcome as more likely in hindsight and learning negative 
outcome information would lead participants to rate the negative outcome as more likely 
in hindsight. Alternatively, one would expect that learning no outcome information would 
result in participants either accurately recalling their original predictions or shifting 
randomly in the direction of either the positive or negative outcome. Thus, I added a third 
outcome condition in which participants did not learn any outcome information, therefore 
serving as a control for the experimental conditions.  
The third modification I made to Carli’s methodology was adding a perspective 
manipulation to the vignette. Little research has been conducted to compare the magnitude 
of hindsight bias exhibited by people who have personally experienced an event versus 
those evaluating an event that another person has experienced. Furthermore, little research 
has examined whether perspective-taking affects hindsight bias. Therefore, a main goal of 
the present study was to evaluate whether there are differences in hindsight bias exhibited 
among participants who have been asked to imagine personally experiencing an event (self-
perspective condition) versus those who have been asked to imagine another person 
experiencing an event (other-perspective condition). This manipulation was intended to 
address the question of whether perspective-taking is related to hindsight bias and also to 
extend our understanding of whether evaluating a self-relevant, or a personally 
experienced, outcome affects hindsight bias differently from evaluating an outcome 
another person has experienced. Thus, another objective of my study was to investigate 
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whether hindsight bias differed among participants in the self- and other-perspective 
conditions.   
In addition to rating the likelihood of various outcomes to the vignette they read, 
participants in Carli’s study also completed a memory questionnaire. The questionnaire 
assessed both their memory for the vignette, as well as whether participants 
misremembered details about the vignette that were stereotypically consistent with the 
outcome that they learned. Carli found that participants misremembered a significant 
number of details stereotypically consistent with the outcome they learned (i.e., 
participants in the positive outcome condition misremembered more details stereotypically 
consistent with a marriage proposal than participants in the negative outcome condition; 
participants in the negative outcome condition misremembered more details stereotypically 
consistent with a rape than participants in the positive outcome condition). Thus, another 
objective of the current study was to replicate Carli’s finding that participants 
misremember details about the vignette that are stereotypically consistent with the outcome 
information they learn. Because all participants in Carli’s study read the vignette from a 
third-person perspective, she was not able to investigate whether there were any differences 
in the details misremembered among participants for whom the vignette was self-relevant 
versus those evaluating the vignette from an other perspective. Thus, another aim of this 
study was to determine if there were any differences in the number of outcome-consistent 
details that are misremembered among those in the self- and other-perspective conditions.   
The fourth and final modification made to the experimental design was the addition 
of a trivia task. This trivia task was included for two reasons. Firstly, it was intended to 
create interference between participants’ memory of their original likelihood ratings for 
each of the vignette outcomes and their recall of their original ratings once they had learned 
the actual outcome. Secondly, trivia items are a standard paradigm used to assess hindsight 
bias. Thus, whether participants show hindsight bias on the trivia task should indicate their 
propensity towards exhibiting hindsight bias in general. Given this, the final objective was 
to determine whether participants’ hindsight bias magnitude on the vignette task would 
correlate with their hindsight bias magnitude on the trivia task.    
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Overall, I expect to find the following:  
1. Participants who learn outcome information will exhibit hindsight bias 
consistent with the outcome they learn. Specifically, participants in the positive 
and negative outcome conditions will recall their original likelihood ratings for 
the consistent outcome (i.e., Jack proposed to Barbara or Jack raped Barbara) 
as being higher than their original likelihood ratings actually were for that 
outcome and/or they will recall their original likelihood ratings for the three 
inconsistent outcomes (i.e., Jack raped Barbara or Jack proposed to Barbara; 
Jack and Barbara began dating; Jack and Barbara had a one-night stand) as 
being lower than their original likelihood ratings actually were for those 
outcomes. I expect that participants who do not learn outcome information will 
either accurately recall their original likelihood ratings, or their recall of their 
original likelihood ratings will shift randomly. 
2. Participants who learn outcome information will misremember details that 
were not explicitly stated in the vignette, but that are stereotypical of the 
outcome they learn. Specifically, participants who learn positive outcome 
information will be more likely than those who learn negative or no outcome 
information to misreport non-presented details that are stereotypically 
associated with a marriage proposal. Conversely, participants who learn 
negative outcome information will be more likely than those who learn positive 
or no outcome information to misreport non-presented details stereotypically 
associated with a rape. 
3. The effects described in predictions 1 and 2 will be larger in the group of 
participants randomly assigned to read the vignette from the self perspective 
than from the other perspective. 
4. Hindsight bias magnitude on the vignette task will correlate with hindsight bias 
magnitude on the trivia task.   
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Chapter 2.  
 
Method 
2.1. Participants  
An a priori power analysis using the G*Power 3 statistical software (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that a total of 132 participants was necessary 
to observe the expected effects with a power of .95 and a medium effect size of .2. To 
ensure there was enough usable data, I aimed to test 160 female participants (see below for 
justification of why only female participants were included). Overall, 235 undergraduate 
students from two universities in British Columbia participated in this study. Two hundred 
and ten participants completed both sessions. Forty-seven of the participants who 
completed both sessions were males and 163 were females. However, only females were 
included in analyses because it was predicted prior to data collection that men would not 
be able to assume the perspective of the main character of the vignette given that she was 
a woman, and the vignette described her relationship with a man. Twelve females were 
excluded from analyses either because they did not pass the manipulation check described 
below (n = 8), because they provided incomplete data for the vignette task (n = 1), or 
because they received the wrong set of materials for the second part of the study (n = 3). 
Thus, a total of 151 female participants were included in analyses. The participants had a 
mean age of 20.45 years (SD = 5.45). Participants either received course credit or extra 
credit for their time. 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Vignette  
The fictional vignette used in this study (see Appendix A) was adapted from Carli’s 
(1999) study. Only minor changes were made to the vignette to make it more 
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geographically relevant to the particular sample of students participating in the current 
study (i.e., locations mentioned in the vignette developed by Carli were changed to reflect 
locations that the participants would be familiar with). Also, a perspective manipulation 
was added to the vignette; participants were either instructed to read the vignette from the 
first-person perspective or from the third-person perspective. As a manipulation check, 
participants were asked at the end of the study whether they understood how to read the 
vignette from the perspective they were assigned. Participants who responded “no” were 
excluded from analyses.  
The vignette was three pages in length. The first page contained a description of a 
woman named Barbara. The last two pages depicted the relationship between Barbara and 
a man named Jack. The narrative was written from Barbara’s perspective, and described a 
series of events that transpired between Barbara and Jack. Unlike the vignette Carli used, 
this vignette had no clear ending in terms of the outcome of their relationship. Instead, 
participants rated the likelihood of each of four possible outcomes to the vignette (see 
Appendix B) on a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 9 (very likely).  
Of the four possible outcomes for which participants provided likelihood ratings, 
one was the positive outcome that one third of participants would eventually learn (Jack 
proposed to Barbara), one was the negative outcome that one third of participants would 
eventually learn (Jack raped Barbara), and two were filler outcomes that no participants 
would learn (Jack and Barbara began dating; Jack and Barbara had a one-night stand). 
Participants in the experimental conditions (positive and negative outcome information) 
responded to these items on two separate occasions, once before learning outcome 
information, and once after (see Appendix C for outcome information that participants in 
the positive and negative outcome conditions learned). Participants in the control condition 
(no outcome information) also responded to these items on two separate occasions; 
however, they did not learn outcome information before making their second set of 
judgments. Outcomes were counterbalanced and appeared in a different order the second 
time they were presented.  
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It was expected that if outcome knowledge influenced participants’ recall of their 
original judgments about the likelihood of the vignette outcomes (i.e., if they showed 
hindsight bias), it could be demonstrated in two possible ways. First, they would exhibit 
hindsight bias if, for the outcome consistent with the outcome information they learned, 
they recalled their original judgments as being greater in magnitude than their original 
judgments for that outcome actually were. For example, if a participant originally judged 
the likelihood of Jack proposing to Barbara as a 4, and then learned the positive outcome 
information, she would show hindsight bias if she recalled her original judgment about 
Jack proposing to Barbara as 5 or above. Thus, if participants demonstrated hindsight bias 
for the outcome consistent with the outcome information they learned, the difference 
between their recalled judgment and their original judgment would be positive. To measure 
hindsight bias magnitude for the consistent outcome, a difference score was calculated 
between participants’ original judgments and their recall of their original judgments as 
follows:  
CO ROJ – CO OJ 
*Note: CO = Consistent outcome, ROJ = Recall of original judgment, OJ = Original judgment. 
Participants might also exhibit hindsight bias if for the three inconsistent outcomes 
(i.e., the outcomes they did not learn), they recalled their original judgments as being 
smaller in magnitude than their original judgments for those outcomes actually were. For 
example, say a participant originally rated the likelihood of Jack proposing to Barbara as a 
4 and then learned the negative outcome information. That participant would show 
hindsight bias if she recalled her original judgment about the likelihood of Jack proposing 
to Barbara as a 3 or below. Thus, if participants showed hindsight bias for the inconsistent 
outcomes, the difference between their recalled judgments and their original judgments for 
those outcomes would be negative. In order to measure hindsight bias magnitude for the 
inconsistent outcomes, a difference score was calculated between the average of 
participants’ recall of their original judgments for the three inconsistent outcomes and the 
average of their original judgments for those same three outcomes as follows:  
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(
IO ROJ1+ IO ROJ2+ IO ROJ3
3
) - (
IO OJ1+ IO OJ2+ IO OJ3
3
) 
*Note: IO = Inconsistent outcome, ROJ = Recall of original judgment, OJ = Original Judgments and the 
numbers 1, 2, and 3 in the numerator refer to each of the three inconsistent outcomes.  
Participants who did not learn outcome information were dummy coded either as if 
they had learned the positive outcome or as if they had learned the negative outcome. Based 
on which outcome participants in the no outcome condition were coded as having learned, 
their hindsight bias magnitude for the consistent and inconsistent outcomes was measured 
accordingly. Perfect recollections were included in the calculation of hindsight bias 
magnitude. All participants received both an outcome-consistent and an outcome-
inconsistent difference score. Then, I subtracted participants’ outcome-inconsistent score 
from their outcome-consistent score for a measure of overall hindsight bias magnitude as 
follows: 
Hindsight bias on consistent outcome – Hindsight bias on inconsistent outcomes 
 
2.2.2. Memory Questionnaire  
The memory questionnaire used in this study (see Appendix C) was the same 
questionnaire used in Carli’s study. The questionnaire consisted of 52 true/false items. 
Twenty-four of the 52 items assessed participants’ memory for what actually occurred in 
the vignette. The remaining 28 items described details that did not occur in the vignette, 
but rather, that are stereotypically associated with rape (e.g., “Barbara and Jack met at a 
bar;” n = 14) or marriage proposals (“Jack wanted Barbara to meet his parents;” n = 14). I 
calculated the average percentage of correct responses on the memory questionnaire, the 
average percentage of details stereotypically consistent with marriage proposals 
misremembered, and the average percentage of details stereotypically consistent with rape 
misremembered.  
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2.2.3. Trivia Task  
The trivia task used in this study (see Appendix D) was adopted from Coolin et al., 
2014. The task consisted of 40 arcane trivia items, which required participants to respond 
with numerical answers lying on continuous scales. The unit of measurement in which 
participants were expected to respond for each item was presented with the question. For 
example, if the question was “what is the distance (in kilometers) between New York and 
Los Angeles?” the answer would be “4,546 kilometers.” There were no limits in terms of 
the magnitude of numbers with which participants could respond. Question order was 
fixed.   
Items on which participants either gave no original judgment, gave no recall of their 
original judgment, or both were eliminated from analyses. Similarly, items on which 
participants responded with a range of values (e.g., “20-30” or “1980’s”) for either their 
original judgment, recall of their original judgment, or both were eliminated from analyses. 
This eliminated 4.39% of the data for the trivia task. Perfect recollections were not included 
in the calculation of hindsight bias magnitude (note: the data pattern remains the same 
when perfect recollections are included).  
To measure hindsight bias magnitude, I used Pohl’s ∆z index (Pohl, 2007). This 
index is particularly useful in this case for a couple of reasons: (1) it allows one to measure 
the extent to which outcome information biases participants’ recall of their original 
judgments and (2) it allows one to make comparisons across items using different scales 
of measurement by standardizing participants’ responses for each item. With this index, it 
is expected that participants’ recall of their original judgments will systematically shift 
away from their original judgments and toward the correct judgments on items for which 
participants learn the correct judgments (experimental items) but not for control items 
(random or no change was expected on these items). This shift is measured by comparing 
the difference between a participant’s original judgment and the correct judgment to the 
difference between that participant’s recall of her original judgment and the correct 
judgment.   
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To calculate hindsight bias using Pohl’s ∆z index, I first computed the absolute 
difference between participants’ original judgments and the correct judgments for each of 
the 40 trivia items as follows:  
|OJ - CJ| 
*Note: OJ = Original judgment, CJ = Correct judgment 
To standardize item scales, I divided each participant’s resulting difference score 
on a given item by the standard deviation of all participants’ difference scores on that item. 
I did this individually for each participant for each of the 40 items. 
Next, I computed the absolute difference between participants’ recall of their 
original judgments and the correct judgments for each item as follows:  
|ROJ - CJ| 
*Note: ROJ = Recall of original judgment, CJ = Correct judgment 
Once again, I divided each participant’s resulting difference score on a given item 
by the standard deviation of all participants’ difference scores on that item for all 40 items.  
I then subtracted the standardized difference between a participant’s recall of her 
original judgment and the correct judgment from the standardized difference between a 
participant’s original judgment and correct judgment for each of the 40 items for each 
participant as follows:  
|OJ̅̅̅̅  - CJ̅̅ ̅| - |ROJ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  - CJ̅̅ ̅| 
*Note: The overbars are used to represent the standardized differences between participants’ original 
judgments and the correct judgments and between participants’ recall of their original judgments and the 
correct judgments, as described above.  
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For each item on which a participant recalled her original judgment as being closer 
to the correct judgment than her original judgment was, there should be a positive Pohl’s 
index score. Thus, if participants exhibit hindsight bias, the overall magnitude of Pohl’s 
index scores for experimental items should be greater than the overall magnitude of Pohl’s 
index scores for the control items. Finally, I computed the median of each participant’s 
responses for the 20 experimental items and the 20 control items separately as a measure 
of overall hindsight bias magnitude for each set of items. The type of item (experimental 
vs. control) was treated as a repeated measure.  
2.2.4. Relationship between performance on vignette task and trivia task  
For the purposes of testing whether there was a relationship between a participants’ 
performance on the vignette task and the trivia task, I calculated two indices (one for  each 
task) reflecting overall hindsight bias magnitude for each task. For the vignette task, I 
calculated difference scores between participants’ hindsight bias magnitude on the 
consistent and inconsistent vignette outcomes:  
Hindsight bias on consistent outcome – Hindsight bias on inconsistent outcomes 
For the trivia task, I calculated difference scores between participants’ hindsight 
bias magnitude on the experimental and control items:  
Hindsight bias on experimental items – Hindsight bias on control items 
2.3. Procedure 
Figure 1 depicts the study procedure. This two-part study was conducted in groups 
of up to 10 participants per session for both session one and session two, with the two 
sessions separated by roughly a week-long delay (Mdelay = 7.08 days, Rangedelay = 6 – 10 
days). The first session lasted approximately 30 minutes and the second session lasted 
roughly 60 minutes, for a total of 90 minutes.   
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2.3.1. Session one  
Participants first gave their informed consent and then completed a demographic 
questionnaire. Next, participants were administered the vignette describing the relationship 
between Barbara and Jack, which they were told was a case history of a woman who had 
agreed to be interviewed about an important event in her life as part of a study examini ng 
significant life experiences. Before reading the vignette, each participant was assigned to 
receive one of two further instructions regarding the perspective from which they should 
read the vignette. The instructions were clearly outlined at the beginning of the vignette 
and were also read aloud to participants. Participants were either assigned to the “self” or 
“other” perspective condition.  
Participants in the “self” condition, were instructed to read the description of 
Barbara and the story of her relationship with Jack from a first-person perspective, as if 
they were Barbara and were actually experiencing everything she experienced in the story 
they read. Participants in the “other” condition, were instructed to read the description of 
Barbara and the story of her relationship with Jack from a third-person perspective, only 
evaluating the events that were described. The research sessions were blocked according 
to which perspective participants were instructed to read the vignette from so that all 
participants in a given session were reading the vignette from the same perspective. The 
sessions were blocked by perspective condition because I believed it might have been 
challenging for participants to understand the instructions. Thus, by blocking by 
perspective condition, I could read the instructions aloud to the group of participants and 
allow them the opportunity to ask questions about how they were expected to read the 
vignette in case they were unsure.  
Immediately after reading the vignette, participants rated the likelihood of four 
possible outcomes to the vignette on nine-point rating scales; again, these outcomes were: 
(1) Jack proposed to Barbara (positive outcome), (2) Jack raped Barbara (negative 
outcome), (3) Jack and Barbara began dating (filler outcome) or (4) Jack and Barbara had 
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a one-night stand (filler outcome). These likelihood judgments, made prior to learning 
outcome information, were participants’ original judgments for the vignette task.  
Once participants made their original judgments about the likelihood of each 
outcome, they completed a trivia task consisting of 40 questions. The instructions for this 
task informed participants that the questions were testing their general knowledge. The 
items were projected on a screen one at a time, automatically changing to the next question 
after 20 seconds, thus controlling for how much time participants had to answer each 
question. These initial responses (i.e., before learning the correct judgments) to the trivia 
questions served as participants’ original judgments for the trivia task.   
2.3.2. Session two  
At the start of the second session, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three outcome conditions. Two-thirds of participants learned one of two outcomes to the 
vignette they read in the first session: (1) a positive outcome (Jack proposed to Barbara), 
or (2) a negative outcome (Jack raped Barbara), and one-third of participants did not learn 
an outcome. Immediately after learning the outcome to the vignette or at the beginning of 
the session for those who did not learn an outcome, participants completed a memory 
questionnaire consisting of 52 true/false items. Again, 24 of the items assessed participants’ 
memory for what occurred in the vignette, while 28 of the items assessed whether 
participants misremembered details about the event that were stereotypically consistent 
with the proposal and rape outcomes. Participants indicated whether the items were 
presented in the vignette they read by circling either “true” or “false” on the response sheet. 
They also indicated how confident they were that the item was either true or false by 
assigning a confidence rating to each of their answers on a scale ranging between 50% (just 
guessing) to 100% (completely certain) (note: confidence ratings were taken in Carli’s 
study to be used in a mediation analyses assessing outcome condition and hindsight bias. 
The mediation analyses are not central to my hypotheses, therefore, I did not use these 
ratings for data analyses. I only included these ratings as a way of maintaining consistency 
in the procedure for replication purposes).  
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Next, participants in the positive and negative outcome conditions were once again 
reminded of the actual outcome to Barbara’s story, and were asked to recall their original 
likelihood ratings (i.e., their ratings before they learned the actual outcome) for the four 
possible outcomes to the vignette. Of course, a reminder was not issued to participants in 
the no outcome condition. Once participants completed this questionnaire, they learned the 
correct answers to either the first half (1-20) or second half (21-40) of the items on the 
trivia task. The trivia items were once again projected on a screen, one at a time, for 20 
seconds each. This time, the correct answers were presented underneath the respective 
questions for half the items. Participants were asked to indicate what their original 
judgment was for each item immediately after reading the correct judgment for that 
particular item. They were also asked to recall their original judgments for the items for 
which they did not learn the correct judgments. Finally, participants were fully debriefed, 
and asked to indicate whether they still wanted their data to be analyzed given the element 
of deception used in the study. Because of the sensitive nature of the negative outcome that 
some participants learned, they were reminded to seek help from the counselling center if 
they experienced any distress as a result of participating in the study. However, no 
participants were visibly distressed during the study session.  
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Figure 1. Study Procedure 
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Results 
3.1. Vignette Task 
I conducted a reliability analysis of the consistent and inconsistent vignette 
outcomes to determine the internal consistency of the measures used to assess hindsight 
bias on the vignette task. The inconsistent outcomes were reverse coded. The analysis 
revealed poor internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .08) among the vignette outcomes.   
To investigate the effects of outcome and perspective on hindsight bias, I conducted 
a 3 (outcome: positive vs. negative vs. none) x 2 (perspective: self vs. other) ANOVA in 
which outcome and perspective were the between-subjects factors and hindsight bias 
magnitude was the dependent variable. The mean hindsight bias magnitude that 
participants exhibited is presented as a function of outcome and perspective in Table 2. 
There were no significant differences in hindsight bias magnitude between the self and 
other perspective conditions [F(1, 145) = .05, p = .83] as is depicted in Figure 2.  
There was a main effect of outcome, F(2, 145) = 8.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. As seen 
in Figure 3, Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed no significant differences in hindsight bias 
magnitude between the no outcome condition (M = .25, SD = 2.64) and the positive 
outcome condition (M = .38, SD = 2.09).  However, there were significant differences in 
hindsight bias magnitude between the negative outcome condition (M = 1.95, SD = 2.09) 
and the no outcome condition, p = .001, and between the negative outcome condition and 
the positive outcome condition, p = .002. Thus, only participants in the negative outcome 
condition exhibited hindsight bias. There was no significant interaction between 
perspective and outcome, F(2, 145) = .27, p = .77.     
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Table 2. Mean hindsight bias magnitude (and standard deviations) as a 
function of outcome and perspective condition on the vignette task. 
Outcome  Perspective 
 
Self                               Other                               Total 
No Outcome  
 
  .04 (2.79)                       .49 (2.51)                         .25 (2.64) 
Positive Outcome 
 
  .38 (2.52)                       .38 (1.65)                         .38 (2.09) 
 
Negative Outcome  2.06 (2.18)                     1.85 (2.03)                       1.95 (2.09) 
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Figure 2.  Mean hindsight bias magnitude as a function of perspective condition 
(collapsed across outcome). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
  
Figure 3.  Mean hindsight bias magnitude as a function of outcome (collapsed 
across perspective). Error bars represent standard error. 
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3.2. Relationship between Hindsight Bias on the Vignette Task 
and the Trivia Task 
Before conducting a correlation test between participants’ performance on the 
vignette task and the trivia task, I conducted scale analyses on the trivia task to determine 
the internal consistency of the trivia items. To do so, I separated the first half of the trivia 
items from the second half of the items for analyses. Furthermore, I separated participants 
based on whether they learned the correct judgments to the first half or the second half of 
the items. For the first half of the items, I analyzed the internal consistency of responses 
among only those participants who learned the correct judgments to the first half of the 
trivia items. Conversely, for the second half of the items, I analyzed the internal consistency 
of responses among only those participants who learned the correct judgments to the 
second half of the trivia items. The eight least reliable items were dropped from each half 
of the items, resulting in 16 items dropped in total. The internal consistency of the first half 
of the items was satisfactory, with a Cronbach’s α of .74. Unfortunately, the internal 
consistency of the second half of items did not reach this same satisfactory level, with a 
Cronbach’s α of .48. 
Next, I tested whether participants exhibited hindsight bias on the standard 
hindsight bias task—the trivia task. I conducted a paired samples t-test to compare 
hindsight bias magnitude on experimental and control items. As expected, this revealed a 
significant difference in hindsight bias magnitude between the experimental (M = .12, SD 
= .09) and control (M = .08, SD = .07) items, t(150) = 4.38, p < .001, d = .36.   
To determine whether there was a relationship between participants’ performance 
on the vignette task and the trivia task, I constructed a scatter plot of the overall magnitude 
of hindsight bias that participants exhibited on each task (see Figure 4). Preliminary 
analyses revealed no linear association between the magnitude of hindsight bias that 
participants exhibited on the vignette task and the magnitude of hindsight bias they 
exhibited on the trivia task. A Kendall’s tau-b correlation revealed no significant 
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association between the magnitude of hindsight bias that participants exhibited on the 
vignette outcomes and trivia items, r(149) = .05, p = .39.  
 
Figure 4.  Association between participants' hindsight bias magnitude on 
vignette task and trivia task. 
3.3. Memory Questionnaire  
Finally, I examined responses on the memory questionnaire to determine whether 
participants who learned outcome information misremembered details about the vignette 
that were stereotypically consistent with the outcome they learned. First, I conducted a 3 
(outcome: positive vs. negative vs. none) x 2 (perspective: self vs. other) ANOVA with the 
mean percentage of correct answers to the 24 memory items as the dependent variable. 
Results revealed no significant differences between the positive (M = .66, SD = .09), 
negative (M = .66, SD = .10), and no (M = .65, SD = .09) outcome conditions in the average 
percentage of correct answers for the memory items, F(2,145) = .22, p = .81. There were 
also no differences between the self (M = .67, SD = .10) and other (M = .65, SD = .09) 
perspective conditions, F(1,145) = 1.09, p = .30. 
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In order to assess whether participants misremembered details stereotypically 
consistent with the outcome they learned, I conducted 3 (outcome: positive vs. negative vs. 
none) x 2 (perspective: self vs. other) x 2 (type of detail misremembered: positive vs. 
negative) mixed ANOVA in which perspective and outcome were the between-subjects 
factors, the type of stereotypically consistent detail misremembered was the within-subject 
factor, and the average percentage of stereotypically consistent details misremembered was 
the dependent variable. Table 3 displays the average percentage of positive and negative 
stereotypically consistent details misremembered as a function of perspective and outcome 
condition.  
There were no significant differences in the average percentage of stereotypically 
consistent details misremembered between the self and other perspective conditions, F(1, 
145) = .87, p = .35. There were also no significant differences between the positive, 
negative, and no outcome conditions on the average percentage of stereotypically 
consistent details misremembered, F(2, 145) = .06, p = .95. Finally, there were no 
significant effects of type of stereotypically consistent details misremembered or 
interaction effects of perspective, outcome, or type of detail misremembered.  
Table 3.  Mean percentage of positive and negative stereotypically consistent 
details (and standard deviations) misremembered as a function of 
perspective condition and outcome. 
 Positive Stereotypically Consistent Details 
 Self                                          Other 
No Outcome  32.1% (17.3%)                         37.3% (16.3%) 
Positive Outcome 38.0% (11.6%)                         32.4% (16.6%) 
Negative Outcome 36.9% (12.7%)                         31.3% (15.3%) 
 Negative Stereotypically Consistent Details 
 Self                                          Other 
No Outcome  33.2% (10.3%)                         33.5% (15.9%) 
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Positive Outcome 33.4% (15.5%)                         29.7% (15.5%) 
Negative Outcome 33.1% (12.7%)                         32.1% (16.6%) 
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Discussion  
In the current study, I attempted to replicate and extend Carli’s (1999) findings that 
individuals show hindsight bias consistent with the outcome information they learn as well 
as misremember antecedent events stereotypically consistent with the outcome they learn. 
I also sought to investigate two factors that seem to underlie motivational explanations of 
hindsight bias: outcome valence and outcome self-relevance. To test the effects of outcome 
valence on hindsight bias, participants either learned positive, negative, or no outcome 
information before attempting to recall their original predictions about the likelihood of 
various outcomes. Furthermore, because past research has revealed a difference in 
hindsight bias for self-relevant outcomes, I added a perspective (self vs. other) 
manipulation to the vignette to assess whether hindsight bias differed among participants 
for whom the outcome varied in self-relevance. Rather than using a hypothetical design to 
test these effects, I used a memory design and also included a standard hindsight bias task 
(trivia task) to measure participants’ propensity to exhibit hindsight bias.  
4.1.  The Role of Outcome Valence on Vignette Task Performance 
Outcome valence influenced participants’ recall of their original likelihood ratings 
for the various vignette outcomes. Participants in the negative outcome condition exhibited 
hindsight bias, recalling their original judgments for the consistent outcome as being 
greater than their original judgments were, and recalling their original judgments for the 
inconsistent outcomes as being lower than their original judgments were. However, 
participants in the positive outcome condition exhibited no hindsight bias. While their 
recalled judgments shifted slightly in the expected direction (i.e., they recalled their 
original judgments for the consistent outcome as being marginally greater than they 
recalled their original judgments for the inconsistent outcomes), this difference was not 
significant, nor did it differ from participants’ responses in the no outcome condition.  
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Though some research suggests that individuals show increased hindsight bias for 
negative outcome information as compared to positive or neutral outcome information, 
Carli (1999) found that participants who learned positive outcome information exhibited 
hindsight bias for the positive outcome to the same degree as participants in the negative 
outcome condition exhibited hindsight bias for the negative outcome. There are several 
possible explanations for why participants in the positive outcome condition in the current 
study were not influenced by their knowledge of the positive outcome.  Carli’s study was 
conducted nearly two decades ago and it is possible that due to differences in societal 
expectations today, participants in the current study found it hard to believe the proposal 
outcome. To explore this possibility, I compared participants’ mean original likelihood 
ratings for the positive and negative outcomes. Overall, participants originally judged the 
likelihood of the proposal outcome as significantly lower than the likelihood of the rape 
outcome. This finding indicates that participants in this study found the proposal outcome 
more unexpected than the rape outcome.  
Some literature (see e.g., Ofir & Mazursky, 1997) posits that hindsight bias may 
not occur when an outcome is extremely unexpected. After learning outcome information, 
individuals typically engage in a sense-making process to understand the outcome and why 
it occurred. This often leads to increased hindsight bias, as explanations that support the 
outcome become more obvious to an individual, while alternative outcomes, and thus 
details unrelated to the actual outcome, seem less likely (Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007). However, 
when an outcome is extremely unexpected, individuals may find it challenging to make 
sense of the outcome. This likely instills the belief that they could not have foreseen that 
outcome, making them more likely to remember their original judgments about the 
outcome.   
My discrepant finding that the positive outcome information did not lead to 
hindsight bias might also be attributed to the fact that I used a memory design in the current 
study rather than a hypothetical design, as was used in Carli’s study. Research typically 
shows that hypothetical designs produce larger hindsight bias effects than memory designs 
(Campbell & Tesser, 1983; Pohl, 2007; Powell, 1988; Wood, 1978). In hypothetical 
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designs, participants are never explicitly asked to make a judgment about the outcome 
before learning the actual outcome. Thus, they may not generate their own judgments about 
the outcome before learning the actual outcome. Participants in the current memory design 
were forced to consider several possible outcomes before learning the actual outcome. As 
a result, the actual outcome may seem more obvious to participants in a hypothetical design 
than a memory design. There may be a qualitative difference between recalling one’s 
original judgments after learning outcome information and imagining how one would have 
responded had he/she not known the actual outcome.   
Along those same lines, there is evidence that hindsight bias is comprised of three 
components: foreseeability, inevitability, and memory distortion (Blank et al., 2008; Blank 
& Peters, 2010; Nestler et al., 2010). These three components can be distinguished from 
one another, and can contribute to hindsight bias in different ways. Of the three 
components, it is most likely that Carli measured inevitability, because she asked 
participants to predict the likelihood of each outcome after learning the actual outcome. 
Alternatively, participants in the current study were asked to recall their original judgments 
after learning outcome information. While there may have been an inevitability component 
to the judgments participants made in the current study, their recall of their original 
judgments is more likely a measure of memory distortion. Thus, differences in the type of 
component measured, along with differences in how believable participants perceived the 
outcomes to be, may have contributed to differences in observed hindsight bias.   
4.2. The Role of Self-Relevance on Vignette Task Performance 
Despite my predictions that participants in the self-perspective condition would 
exhibit hindsight bias to a greater degree than those in the other-perspective condition, 
there were no differences between these two perspective conditions. While discrepancies 
remain in the literature regarding whether self-relevant outcomes lead to increased or 
decreased hindsight bias, research has demonstrated that there are at least differences in 
hindsight bias for self-relevant outcomes versus outcomes that another person has 
 46 
experienced. In this study, however, I did not observe differences in hindsight bias for 
outcomes that were intended to be made more self-relevant through taking the perspective 
of the person who experienced the outcomes.   
Perhaps taking the perspective of another person when evaluating an outcome they 
experienced is insufficient for increasing the self-relevance of the outcome to the extent 
needed to affect hindsight bias. Participants indicated that they understood the perspective 
from which they were supposed to read the vignette; however, there were no differences in 
hindsight bias as a result of the perspective manipulation. Blank and Peters (2010) found 
similar results in a study that investigated the effects of outcome self-relevance, outcome 
controllability (high vs. low) and hindsight component being measured (foreseeability vs. 
inevitability). Some participants were assigned to read a vignette from the actor’s 
perspective, while others were assigned to read the vignette from an observer’s perspective. 
Participants assigned to the actor’s perspective indicated that they identified with the actor. 
Despite this, they exhibited little difference from participants in the observer perspective 
condition on judgments of foreseeability when the outcome was low in controllability, as 
well as on judgments of inevitability. Actually experiencing an outcome is certainly 
different from imagining experiencing that outcome. Thus, it may be the case that 
manipulating self-relevance of the outcome through perspective-taking is not as effective 
as manipulating self-relevance through personally experiencing an outcome, and therefore, 
may not influence hindsight bias in the same manner.  
It is also possible that perspective-taking has little effect on the memory distortion 
component of hindsight bias. In both perspective conditions, participants made original 
judgments about four outcomes that they later attempted to recall. Though participants 
could have effectively taken their assigned perspectives when reading the vignette, their 
ability to recall their original judgments after learning outcome information may have 
remained unaffected. Perhaps differences in hindsight bias for self-relevant outcomes 
versus outcomes relevant to another person only arise from measuring hindsight bias in 
terms of foreseeability or inevitability. In fact, Blank and Peters (2010) attribute discrepant 
findings about whether individuals exhibit increased or decreased hindsight bias for 
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negative self-relevant outcomes to differences in the hindsight component being measured. 
They suggest that hindsight bias may decrease for negative self-relevant outcomes when 
the foreseeability component is being measured. Alternatively, negative self-relevant 
outcomes may result in increased hindsight bias if the inevitability component is being 
measured. Therefore, perhaps no differences in hindsight bias were observed between the 
perspective conditions in the current study because the self-relevance of the outcome did 
not affect the memory distortion component. 
4.3. Relationship between Performance on Vignette Task and 
Trivia Task  
Participants performed as expected on the standard trivia task used to measure 
hindsight bias. On items for which participants learned the correct judgments, they recalled 
their original judgments as being closer to the correct judgments than their original 
judgments actually were. Alternatively, on items for which participants did not learn the 
correct judgments, their recall of their original judgments was less consistent with the 
correct judgments. Because the trivia task is a standard paradigm for measuring hindsight 
bias, I expected that participants’ propensity to exhibit hindsight bias on this task would 
correlate with their propensity to exhibit hindsight bias on the vignette task. However, there 
was no correlation between participants’ performance on the vignette task and the standard 
hindsight bias task.  
It is possible that there is a difference between the way in which judgments are 
made on these two tasks. For example, there is likely little personal investment in the 
correct answer to a trivia question. However, with the vignette outcomes, participants may 
have more deeply encoded their original judgment because they had to consider the various 
details of the vignette they read in order to judge the likelihood of each of the outcomes. 
This deeper encoding may have led to better recall of their original judgments. Therefore, 
participants did not exhibit hindsight bias to the same degree on the vignette task as they 
did on the trivia task. 
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It is also possible that the vignette task involved some degree of the inevitability 
component of hindsight bias whereas for the trivia task, just the memory distortion 
component was involved. On the vignette task, participants must predict the likelihood of 
several outcomes based on the events described. This judgment likely involves some 
consideration of the probability of each outcome. Though participants are asked to recall 
their original judgment after learning outcome information on the vignette task, a task that 
certainly involves the memory distortion component, this may involve some reflection on 
one’s original beliefs about the inevitability of each outcome. Conversely, on the trivia 
task, participants are asked questions on which they likely have little to base their answers. 
Thus, they likely guess on many of the questions, and when asked to recall their answers 
after learning the correct judgment, try to recollect their previous answers without 
necessarily considering how “probable” their response was.   
Differences in rating scales for the vignette task versus the trivia task could have 
also contributed to their lack of correlation. On the vignette task, participants were 
constrained to a nine-point rating scale whereas on the trivia task, they were not constrained 
to a rating scale.  Because they only had to remember a single rating between 1 and 9 on 
the vignette task, it was likely much easier for them to remember their original judgments 
for the vignette outcomes than for the trivia judgements. Also, there were ten times the 
number of items on the trivia task than there were on the vignette task. Thus, there was 
substantially more interference on the trivia task than there was on the vignette task, likely 
making it much more challenging for participants to remember their original judgments for 
the trivia items than for the vignette outcomes. Perhaps there would be a greater correlation 
between the two tasks if the vignette task consisted of a greater number of possible 
outcomes as well as a larger rating scale.  
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4.4. The Role of Outcome Valence and Self-Relevance on Memory 
Questionnaire Performance  
In the current study, there were no significant differences in the average percentage 
of stereotypically consistent details that participants misremembered between the outcome 
conditions. This finding is inconsistent with what Carli discovered in her study. Carli found 
that participants misremembered a significant number of details stereotypically consistent 
with the outcome information they learned, and further, that the more stereotypically 
consistent details participants misremembered, the greater the hindsight bias they 
exhibited. My finding is also inconsistent with what would be expected based on the sense-
making process that often occurs as a result of learning outcome information. Research 
typically finds that in an effort to make sense of an outcome, participants often link 
antecedent events that explain the outcome to the outcome they learned (Blank & Nestler, 
2007; Nestler et al., 2008), perhaps even when those antecedents did not actually occur 
(Carli, 1999).  
The fact that participants in the current study did not misremember a significant 
percentage of stereotypically consistent details might once again be attributed to the fact 
that participants in the current study were asked to make two separate judgments about the 
outcome of the vignette. Because participants had to make original judgments about the 
likelihood of each outcome before learning outcome information, they may have 
considered the events that occurred in the vignette more extensively in order to judge the 
likelihood of the various outcomes. Alternatively, in Carli’s study, participants learned 
right after reading the vignette what the actual outcome was. Thus, they may have 
immediately begun imagining why that outcome occurred, which may have contributed to 
their tendency to misremember details stereotypically consistent with the outcome they 
learned. The increased consideration participants in the current study likely gave to the 
details described in the vignette may have led them to encode the details more deeply. This, 
in turn, might have made it easier for them to remember the specific details of the vignette, 
making them better equipped to discriminate the stereotypically consistent details that were 
not presented in the vignette from those details that were actually presented.   
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It could also be the case that, again, due to differences in societal expectations in 
the present day from those of nearly two decades ago, antecedents stereotypically 
associated with rape or marriage proposals today differ from those presented in Carli’s 
study. Carli’s was one of the few (see also Lindholm, Sjöberg, and Memon, 2014; study 2) 
studies to demonstrate that participants misremembered antecedents stereotypically 
associated with the outcome they learned. However, it is important to understand whether 
the sense-making process associated with hindsight bias can actually lead individuals to 
misremember, or “cognitively reconstruct,” antecedents stereotypically associated with the 
outcome.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations that may have contributed to the findings in this study. 
First, the internal consistency of the vignette task was low. Given that there were only two 
items (consistent outcome and inconsistent outcomes) used to measure hindsight bias on 
the vignette task, it is possible that the small number of items contributed to low internal 
consistency. Results should, therefore, be interpreted in light of this limitation. Second, the 
internal consistency of the first half of the trivia items was notably stronger than that of the 
second half of the trivia items. It seems that the items presented in the second half of the 
trivia task did not measure hindsight bias as reliably as the items presented in the first half.  
While results revealed a significant hindsight bias effect on the trivia items, perhaps 
differences in reliability between the two halves of the trivia task led to smaller effects than 
would have otherwise been observed had the second half of items achieved higher 
reliability. Furthermore, the trivia questions used in this study were adopted from those 
used in previous studies (Bayen et al., 2006; Coolin et al., 2014; Hardt & Pohl, 2003) in 
which significant hindsight bias effects were observed. Thus, I expected these items to 
measure hindsight bias reliably. However, because I observed poorer reliability on the 
second half of the trivia items than the first half, the results should be interpreted with this 
limitation in mind.  
 Another limitation is that there were no differences in hindsight bias as a result of 
perspective-taking. This finding stands in contrast to other research on hindsight bias for 
self-relevant outcomes which typically demonstrates differences in hindsight bias between 
individuals for whom an outcome is self-relevant, and those for whom it is not. It is possible 
that the perspective manipulation was not strong enough to increase the self-relevance of 
the outcome for participants in the self-perspective condition. Other than instructing 
participants to read the vignette from either a first-person or third-person perspective, there 
were no other differences in how the vignette was presented between the two perspective 
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conditions. Because there were no other changes made to the vignette for participants in 
the self-perspective condition, it may have been challenging for them to assume Barbara’s 
perspective. If there are differences in hindsight bias as a result of evaluating an outcome 
from a self perspective versus an other perspective, it may be necessary to further 
manipulate the content of the vignette between the two perspective conditions to detect 
these differences.  
For example, perhaps further modifying the way in which the vignette is written 
will allow participants in the self-perspective condition to more effectively take the first-
person perspective and participants in the other perspective to more effectively take the 
third-person perspective. The vignette is currently written from a first-person perspective 
(e.g., “I met Jack the first day of classes.”), which may have made it challenging for 
participants in the other-perspective condition to read the vignette from a third-person 
perspective. Perhaps if the vignette had been written from a strictly third-person point of 
view (e.g., “Barbara met Jack the first day of classes.”), participants in the other perspective 
condition would have been able to more effectively evaluate the vignette from an outsider’s 
perspective.  
Alternatively, when we read about another person’s experiences, and they are 
written from that person’s perspective, it may be that our default is to read about these 
experiences from our own perspective. For example, some research shows that when 
adopting the perspective of another person, we may egocentrically interpret their 
perspective (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Keysar, 1994). Epley, Keysar, van 
Boven, and Gilovich (2004) posit that when we attempt to adopt another person’s 
perspective, we do not fully set aside our own perspective; rather, we use our own 
perspective as an anchor for another person’s perspective. Thus, as Apperly (2009) 
suggests, errors in perspective-taking “tend to consist of reporting one’s own belief, desire, 
or knowledge rather than that of the target person whose perspective you are supposed to 
be taking (p. 5). In that case, it may have been challenging for participants in the self-
perspective condition to imagine themselves as Barbara.  
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Perhaps, then, it may have been more effective for participants in the self-
perspective condition to be presented with a vignette written in a second-person perspective 
(e.g., “you met Jack the first day of classes”). Blank and Peters (2010) found that this was 
an effective strategy. In their study, participants were assigned to read a scenario from 
either an actor or observer perspective. Participants assigned to the actor perspective read 
the scenario from a second-person perspective whereas participants assigned to the 
observer perspective read the scenario from a third-person perspective. Participants in the 
actor condition reported relatively high identification with the actor (M = 6.8 on a 9-point 
rating scale). Thus, it is possible that using second-person language may have made it 
easier for participants in the self-perspective condition to imagine themselves as the main 
character in the vignette. Future research should examine the most effective ways to 
manipulate perspective, including how to modify the vignette to make it less effortful to 
take the first-person perspective of another person. Future research should also consider 
whether administering another measure, such as an empathy measure, would be useful in 
assessing participants’ ability to take perspectives, and further, whether their performance 
on such a measure would correlate with their hindsight bias magnitude on the vignette task.   
Another limitation is that instead of personally experiencing an event to increase 
its self-relevance, participants in this study imagined experiencing an event. Despite the 
fact that imagining experiencing an event is different from actually experiencing an event, 
it is still important to consider whether perspective-taking may influence hindsight bias. 
There are many situations in which we must attempt to take the perspective of another 
person to assess what they could have known in the past. If individuals can effectively take 
the perspective of another person, they may be able to gauge the foreseeability and/or 
inevitability of an outcome more effectively, and in turn, be more understanding about an 
outcome that another person has experienced. If individuals cannot take the perspective of 
another person, they may be more likely to exhibit hindsight bias when evaluating an 
outcome another person has experienced, especially when the outcome is negative. The 
latter case might be consistent with research suggesting that when people imagine 
themselves in negative situations, they view themselves as invulnerable when compared to 
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another, unknown person (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). Thus, they may be more judgmental of 
the person’s behaviors and less empathetic for the outcome.   
To continue to sort out discrepant findings about how self-relevant outcomes 
influence hindsight bias, future work should consider the hindsight component being 
measured. There seems to be evidence that whether a self-relevant outcome leads to 
differences in hindsight bias may depend on the component being measured. For example, 
it seems that hindsight bias may decrease when a negative self-relevant outcome is 
measured using the foreseeability component, but increase when measured by the 
inevitability component. Furthermore, there may be little difference in hindsight bias 
between a negative self-relevant outcome and a negative outcome that is not self-relevant 
when the memory distortion component is used as a measure. It also remains unclear 
whether hindsight bias for a positive self-relevant outcome may vary as a result of the 
component being measured. Therefore, investigating these differences may help to sort out 
this anomaly in the literature.  
In Carli’s study, participants misremembered a significant number of 
stereotypically consistent antecedent details after making hypothetical hindsight 
judgments. This finding did not hold true in the current study, which employed a memory 
design instead of a hypothetical design. It is possible that because the memory design 
requires participants to make original judgments, they more deeply encode the events that 
precede the outcome. Future research should consider whether the memory design or the 
hypothetical design more closely resembles hindsight judgments made in the real world. If 
the hypothetical design more closely resembles real-world reflections on the past (which 
may be the case given that in many situations, people are unlikely to make original 
judgments about an outcome), people may be more likely to misremember antecedent 
events than is suggested by the results of this study. 
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Chapter 6.  
 
Conclusion 
It is important to consider whether there are differences in hindsight bias for self-
relevant outcomes. It is also important to consider whether there are differences in 
hindsight bias for positive versus negative outcomes. Few studies have directly 
investigated differences in hindsight bias between positive and negative outcomes varying 
in self-relevance (Louie, Curren, & Harich, 2000; Mark et al., 2003). The current study 
sought to extend our understanding of hindsight bias that arises from evaluating positive 
and negative self-relevant outcomes versus evaluating positive and negative outcomes that 
another person has experienced. There were no differences in hindsight bias for outcomes 
intended to vary in self-relevance as a result of manipulating the perspective from which 
participants evaluated the outcome. Thus, future research is needed to determine whether 
there are differences in hindsight bias for positive and negative outcomes varying in self-
relevance, and whether these differences can be detected by manipulating self-relevance 
through perspective-taking. 
This study has important implications. First, this study demonstrates that even with 
a memory design, which typically leads to smaller hindsight bias effects than a hypothetical 
design, people exhibit hindsight bias after learning a negative outcome. This is an important 
finding, particularly when considering the implications this has for legal judgments. The 
majority of legal judgments arise from a negative outcome, and triers of fact are typically 
aware of the nature of the outcome when they are making judgments (Giroux et al., in 
press; Harley, 2007). However, triers of fact are often asked to ignore the severity of the 
negative outcome when making judgments about how responsible the defendant is, and are 
only supposed to consider the defendant’s actions and/or what the defendant knew prior to 
the negative outcome. For example, when evaluating a case in negligence, triers must 
determine the defendant’s behavior prior to an outcome without considering the actual 
outcome. Unfortunately, it may not be possible for triers to disregard their knowledge of a 
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negative outcome when evaluating the events that preceded the outcome. Therefore, their 
knowledge of the negative outcome is likely to influence their judgments about a 
defendant’s actions, leading to biased legal judgments (Caplan, Posner, & Cheney, 1991; 
Evelo & Greene, 2013; Hastie & Viscusi, 1998; LaBine & LaBine, 1996).  
Evaluating what another person knew or how they acted prior to an outcome likely 
involves some degree of perspective-taking, or at least, attempting to take a different 
perspective. For example, when triers evaluate a defendant’s actions that preceded a 
negative outcome (i.e., an offense), they must consider what the defendant could have 
known and whether this knowledge justified their actions. This process should theoretically 
involve attempting to take the perspective of the defendant to evaluate what he/she could 
have known. We did not find any differences in hindsight bias between the perspective 
conditions; thus, it could be that people are just as good at taking others’ perspectives as 
they are at taking their own. However, this is unlikely given what other research has found 
about the egocentric nature in which individuals take another’s perspective (Apperly, 2009; 
Epley et al., 2004).  
Alternatively, it may be the case that individuals cannot fully take the perspective 
of another person when evaluating the other person’s past beliefs or actions. Future 
research should explore this possibility. People may automatically revert to their own 
perspective of the events, which is influenced by outcome knowledge. If one cannot ignore 
a negative outcome to consider another person’s knowledge, beliefs, or actions prior to the 
outcome, this may bias legal judgments. It is important to sort out whether the lack of 
variation among the perspective conditions can be attributed to the fact that people were 
unable to effectively take the perspective of another person, or because people were just as 
good at taking another person’s perspective as they were at taking their own. This could 
elucidate whether asking triers to consider what a defendant could have known prior to an 
outcome might be an effective debiasing strategy. If people are unable to take the 
perspective of the defendant, they are likely unable to effectively consider what the 
defendant could have known prior to the outcome.  
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Considering the nature of the particular negative outcome in this study more 
specifically, the findings can also potentially illuminate cases involving sexual assault. 
Research on sexual assault often finds that people assign blame to the victim for the 
offense, and judge the victim’s behaviors leading up to the outcome as making them 
partially responsible for the outcome. Some researchers have argued that victim blame may 
arise from hindsight bias (Carli, 1999; Carli & Leonard, 1989; Janoff-Bulman, Timko, & 
Carli, 1985); if a negative outcome is perceived as more foreseeable in hindsight, people 
may believe that victim was capable of preventing the outcome. The current study’s 
findings seem to suggest that individuals are likely to judge an outcome, specifically rape, 
as more likely in hindsight than in foresight. Though we did not measure whether 
participants exhibited victim blame, it is possible that they may attribute some 
responsibility for the outcome to the victim in the scenario, Barbara. Future work should 
consider whether victims may also blame themselves for a negative outcome, particularly 
in the case of rape, and exhibit increased hindsight bias (“I should have known that was 
going to happen to me”).  
Much remains to be discovered about how the self-relevance of an outcome as well 
as outcome valence impact hindsight bias. While future studies would continue to benefit 
from researching this question by manipulating whether participants actually experience 
an event or evaluate an event another person has experienced, research might also benefit 
from determining whether self-relevance, and subsequently hindsight bias, can be 
manipulated through perspective-taking. Perspective-taking is an essential aspect of our 
lives and understanding if and how it impacts hindsight bias might be an important 
development in understanding how we evaluate self-relevant outcomes differently from 
outcomes that affect others. This could have important implications for settings in which 
perspective-taking may be necessary to reduce biased decisions.   
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Appendix A.  
 
Vignette 
Instructions for “self” perspective condition:   
 
Read the following case history of a woman named Barbara. First, you will read a 
description of Barbara, then you will read a story about Barbara’s relationship with a man 
named Jack. Read the scenario from a first-person perspective, imagining that you are 
actually Barbara, and that you are actually experiencing everything Barbara experiences in 
the story below.  
 
Instructions for “other” perspective condition:   
 
Read the following case history of a woman named Barbara. First, you will read a 
description of Barbara, then you will read a story about Barbara’s relationship with a man 
named Jack. Read the scenario from a third-person perspective, as if you are an evaluator 
of the story she describes, and are assessing the events that occur in the story below.    
 
Description of Barbara:  
 
Barbara Craw lives in Vancouver. She is 24, single, and recently moved from her parents’ 
home into her own apartment. She works as an account executive’s assistant in a large 
accounting firm.  She is working for her MBA and goes to school nights.  
Barbara is very close to her family, probably stemming from her traditional Catholic 
upbringing.  Her father works for the Canadian government and her mother is an 
accountant.  She has two older brothers, 28 and 26, and a younger sister who is 13.  Her 
family traveled often when she was younger and spent a lot of time together on the ski 
slopes.  They own a chalet at Whistler, which has always been Barbara’s second home. 
Barbara loves skiing and during University, worked at a ski resort.   
Barbara travels frequently for her job and enjoys any opportunity to explore new places.  
After college, she traveled cross-country with her friends and has been to Europe several 
times. 
Barbara graduated with honors as an accounting-finance major from a prestigious 
university.  She was editor of the yearbook and played intramural sports. 
Barbara enjoys meeting new people.  She frequently goes out dancing and to movies, plays 
and concerts.  Barbara dates but hasn’t had any serious boyfriends in the past.   
 66 
She heard about our research from a former coworker and volunteered to be interviewed.  
The events in the interview took place about one year earlier. 
This is Barbara’s story, taken from transcripts of two interviews with her.  It has been edited 
only to give it chronological coherence and to remove any identifying information. 
 
Barbara’s Relationship with Jack:  
 
I met Jack the first day of classes.  Or rather, I noticed him.  I was tired from a long day of 
work and really didn’t want to go to class.  But since I wanted to get my MBA, I had to go.  
Jack was the first person who stood out in our class.  He seemed much more comfortable 
and at ease than the rest of us.  He laughed and joked in class and even our professor had 
to crack a smile.  As the semester progressed, it was evident that Jack was very intelligent, 
too.  He always seemed to know the answer, I thought in a confident way, not like a show-
off.  I remember watching him a lot, the way he talked and moved and laughed.   
One time when the professor made fun of him, he snapped back, very angry and upset.  I 
felt bad for him.  I suppose that’s when I realized how attracted to him I was.  It was more 
like a far-away crush, though; I never thought I would have the opportunity to get to know 
him.   
But in the middle of the semester, we were assigned to a project together.  It dealt with 
analyzing and predicting stock market trends for the next month and a half.  I remember 
that at the time, I couldn’t believe it.  I was actually going to be working with him, spending 
time together.  I was excited.  I started imagining all sorts of things but eventually I realized 
that I had to play it cool.  The project was very important.  We had to do a good job on it.   
As the weeks went by we settled into a pattern.  We would work on the project several 
times a week than go for coffee and a doughnut, and spend some time socializing.  I thought 
we hit it off well.  We always seemed to have something to talk about, whether it was the 
project, class, our jobs, whatever.  As it turned out, Jack was an avid skier.  We spent a lot 
of time talking about different slopes and things.  I would go home with a smile.  Thinking 
about him made me happy.  But I couldn’t tell at all how he felt about me.  Jack seemed 
friendly to everyone.  At the time I thought he might have felt more for me, but it might 
have been just a special friendship.  I couldn’t decide if I should say something.  I didn’t 
want to ruin our friendship if he didn’t feel anything for me.  And I didn’t want to look 
stupid.   
One night I decided to ask him.  But before I could we had an awful argument at the 
restaurant.  The waiter had brought over our coffee but I guess something was wrong with 
Jack’s.  I don’t remember anymore what it was, maybe too much cream.  Anyway, Jack 
called the waiter over and started to really chew him out.  I didn’t think it was such a big 
deal and said so.  Jack turned on me and said, “Who asked you?” in a really cold voice.  I 
was nearly frightened, but mostly angry.  I snapped back at him and he yelled at me, right 
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there in the restaurant.  I couldn’t believe.  I got up and walked home alone, in the dead  of 
night.  I even cried.  The next day he called me at work and apologized.  Later, I didn’t 
think that much about it.   
At the end of the semester, we finished our project and went out to celebrate.  We stayed 
out all night, talking and laughing.  I thought it was incredible the way we were getting 
along.  I was thinking that something was going to happen, or that he might say something 
to me about us, but he never did.  And I was too nervous of what he might say if I brought 
it up. 
Then right in the middle of talking about skiing, he asked me if I would like to go with him 
to his parents’ lodge at Whistler for a ski weekend.  I was excited—of course I accepted.  
But I was nervous; I mean, what did I really know about him?  But I thought it would be 
all right. 
We drove up that Friday after work.  It was a long drive and though we talked a lot, I could 
tell something was on his mind.  I didn’t ask about it though.  When we got there, we went 
to dinner at a steak house.  I had one glass of wine, which made me very sleepy.  When we 
got the ski lodge, I was dozing off.  Jack seemed worn, too. The lodge was warm and I just 
wanted to go to sleep.  Jack brought my bags in and showed me my bedroom.  At the door 
he looked at me strangely.  I waited and then on impulse, I kissed him.  I didn’t know what 
he thought of me, but I was too tired to think about it.   
The next day the weather was incredible.  The snow was perfect and Jack was a really good 
skier.  We had a great time, and though it was cold, we moved around enough to keep 
warm.  At the end of the day, Jack said he was going to take me somewhere special for 
dinner.  We showered and changed at the lodge and I put on a new outfit that I had bought 
just for the occasion.  I felt and looked good.  I thought, maybe this is the night. 
We went to dinner in town and it was wonderful.  He said I looked beautiful and sexy.  
Dinner was delicious and the wine perfect.  It seemed so romantic.  And one point he 
reached across the table and held my hand.  He seemed as if he was about to say something, 
but he didn’t.  When we got back to the lodge, he began saying how much he had enjoyed 
the time we spent together and how much he had looked forward to this weekend.  He 
squeezed my hand and told me that I was sexy and attractive.  He said he had fallen in love 
with me and asked me what I thought of him.  I told him I cared for him, too.  He started 
kissing me.   
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Appendix B.  
 
Vignette Outcomes 
1. Jack Raped Barbara 
 
2. Jack and Barbara began dating 
 
3. Jack proposed marriage to Barbara 
 
4. Jack and Barbara had a one-night stand 
 
Not at all likely       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Likely  
Not at all likely       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Likely  
Not at all likely       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Likely  
Not at all likely       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       Very Likely  
 69 
Appendix C.   
 
Outcome Information 
Positive Outcome 
Last week, you read a case history of a woman named Barbara. The following statement is 
the actual ending to Barbara’s story: 
“It was then that he sat me on the couch and asked me to marry him.” 
 
Negative Outcome 
Last week, you read a case history of a woman named Barbara. The following statement is 
the actual ending to Barbara’s story: 
“It was then that he pushed me down on the couch and raped me.”  
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Appendix D.   
 
Memory Questionnaire Items (and correct responses) 
1. Jack and Barbara stayed out all night after finishing their project.  (true) 
2. Barbara and Jack gazed at each other often. (positive antecedent) 
3. Jack kissed Barbara the first night at the ski lodge.  (false) 
4. Barbara met many men at parties. (negative antecedent) 
5. Barbara goes to night school.  (true) 
6. Jack and Barbara often went out drinking after work. (negative antecedent) 
7. Barbara asked Jack to go skiing.  (false) 
8. Barbara and Jack stayed at a friend’s place for a weekend.  (false)  
9. Barbara and Jack had been dating for a while. (positive antecedent) 
10. Barbara’s family skies.  (true) 
11. Barbara wore sexy clothing when she saw Jack. (negative antecedent) 
12. Barbara told Jack she cared for him.  (true) 
13. Barbara and Jack dined by candlelight. (positive antecedent) 
14. Jack once walked out on Barbara.  (false) 
15. Jack gave Barbara a dozen roses. (positive antecedent) 
16. Barbara was a tease. (negative antecedent) 
17. Barbara and Jack argued at a restaurant.  (true) 
18. Barbara and Jack worked together several times a week.  (true) 
19. Jack liked to drink. (negative antecedent) 
20. Barbara has three siblings.  (true) 
21. Barbara and Jack met at a bar. (negative antecedent) 
22. Jack didn’t talk much in class.  (false) 
23. Barbara was sexually indiscriminate. (negative antecedent) 
24. Barbara was nervous about going on the ski weekend.  (true) 
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25. Barbara wanted Jack to come onto her. (negative antecedent) 
26. Jack told Barbara that she looked sexy.  (true) 
27. Barbara and Jack dined with soft music in the background. (positive antecedent) 
28. Jack had a violent temper. (negative antecedent) 
29. Barbara and Jack studied course material together.  (false) 
30. Jack was very religious. (positive antecedent) 
31. Barbara turned Jack on. (negative antecedent) 
32. Jack took Barbara to New Hampshire.  (false) 
33. Barbara had sexual fantasies about Jack. (negative antecedent) 
34. Barbara likes to go out dancing.  (true) 
35. Jack was aggressive. (negative antecedent) 
36. Jack gave Barbara a ring. (positive antecedent) 
37. Barbara plays piano.  (false) 
38. Jack and Barbara met through a mutual friend. (positive antecedent) 
39. Barbara works for an accounting firm.  (true) 
40. Barbara wanted a family very much. (positive antecedent) 
41. Barbara hated watching TV.  (false) 
42. Barbara and Jack dined at a table with a beautiful view of the mountains. (positive 
antecedent) 
43. Barbara’s father works for the Canadian government.  (true) 
44. Jack was very well mannered. (positive antecedent) 
45. Barbara went to a community college.  (false) 
46. Jack wanted Barbara to meet his parents. (positive antecedent) 
47. Barbara’s mother is a housewife.  (false) 
48. Jack loved children. (positive antecedent) 
49. Barbara wore lots of makeup (negative antecedent) 
50. Barbara and Jack received an A on their project.  (false) 
51. Jack was unpopular with women. (negative antecedent) 
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52. Jack lit a fire at the lodge. (positive antecedent) 
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Appendix E.  
 
Trivia Task Items (and correct responses)  
1. At what temperature does copper melt? (2,415 Celsius) 
2. How high is the Statue of Liberty including its base? (93 meters) 
3. What is the distance between New York and Los Angeles (by road)? (4,546 
kilometers) 
4. In what year was the monkey wrench invented? (1841) 
5. In what year was the harmonica invented? (1821) 
6. How long is the Rhine River? (1,320 kilometers) 
7. What year did the Hundred Years’ War begin? (1339) 
8. What year was the lightning rod invented? (1752) 
9. How long is the Great Wall of China? (3,460 kilometers) 
10. What year were X-rays discovered? (1895) 
11. What is the average depth of the Pacific Ocean? (3,940meters) 
12. On average, how many days is a female elephant’s pregnancy? (631 days)  
13. How long is the Amazon River? (6,556 kilometers) 
14. How long is the Mississippi River? (3,779 kilometers) 
15. What year did William Herschel discover the planet Uranus? (1781) 
16. In what year was Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice first published? (1813)  
17. What is the average temperature of the Antarctic winter? (-68 Celsius) 
18. What is the highest temperature ever measured on Earth? (57 Celsius) 
19. What percentage of the world’s population was under the age of five in 1995? 
(7.7%) 
20. How long is the world’s longest bridge? (38.42 kilometers) 
21. What year did Sir James Dewar, an English chemist, invent the thermos flask? 
(1873) 
22. How many carats is the world’s largest reported diamond? (3,106 carats)  
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23. How many days does the planet Mercury take to make one trip around the sun? (88 
days) 
24. What percentage of the world’s population lived in Africa in 1994? (12.4%) 
25. How many plays did William Shakespeare write? (37 plays) 
26. When travelling 97 kilometers per hour in a car, how much room should you allow 
yourself to brake? (83 meters) 
27. What is the distance between Tokyo and Chicago (by air)? (10,137 kilometers) 
28. What year was the parking meter invented? (1935) 
29. What year did Leonardo da Vinci create Mona Lisa? (1503) 
30. What year did Albert Einstein formulate the theory of relativity? (1903) 
31. What is the diameter of the planet Mars? (6,787 kilometers) 
32. How high is the highest point on Mount Kilimanjaro? (5,895 meters) 
33. What year were the first modern-day Olympic games celebrated? (1896) 
34. What percentage of the world’s population lived in Europe in 1994? (9%) 
35. How many muscles does the human body have? (639 muscles) 
36. What percentage of the human body is composed of nitrogen? (8.5%) 
37. What year was the first mailbox invented? (1653) 
38. When was slavery officially abolished in the United States? (1865) 
39. How many films did Alfred Hitchcock direct? (56 films) 
40. How many detective books did Agatha Christie write? (67 books) 
 
